

## **ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AS A CIVILIZATION OF EVIDENCE AND CLASH OF PROOFS**

**DR. MÜFİT SELİM SARUHAN**

Faculty of Divinity,  
Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey.

Email: saruhan@ankara.edu.tr

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### **Abstract:**

This article intends to examine the role of evidence and its logic within Islamic Philosophy. Islamic Philosophy, as an essential part of Islamic thought, is a discipline that is variant from *Kalām*, Sufism, and *Fiqh*. What distinguishes Islamic Philosophy from other Islamic sciences is its unique epistemological base. Islamic philosophers used and developed many logical arguments and proofs throughout history. When these evidences are analyzed, it can be seen that the motivation behind the use of evidence in the system of Islamic philosophers can be divided into three categories. Firstly, some of the evidence is organized to illustrate and understand philosophical issues. Secondly, some of the evidence is created and formed by philosophers as they are critical and reasonable. Thirdly, in author's opinion, another reason behind the importance of evidence in Islam is to show philosophical ability and originality. While establishing their thought systems and processing their ideas, philosophers have relied on both knowledge and the science of logic involving various argumentations. In this article, we will shed light on Islamic thought as a civilization of knowledge that is rich in terms of evidence and argumentations. In this study, the problem was handled with an inductive approach. Islamic thought is a civilization of knowledge, which also contains rich evidence. Those who mention that Islamic thought is a dogmatic system from time to time with prejudice seem to approach the issue with a perspective that is far from comprehensive analysis and composition. This study shows that the *Holy Qur'ān*, which is the main source of Islamic thought,



draws attention to rational, experiential, and intuitive evidence. The deductive scientific literature in Islamic thought was subjected to a deconstructive analysis. There are many concepts that characterize evidence and proof in Islamic thought. It will be useful to continue this analysis by making an evaluation on them. The diversity of these concepts has been the determinant of the intellectual richness of Islamic thought. The nuance of these concepts provided the opportunity to respond to every detail produced by the mind. Conceptual richness in the fields of epistemology, ontology and ethics in Islamic thought increases reflection.

**Keywords:** *Evidence, Demonstration, Proof, Rhetoric, Knowledge, Dogma, God, Prophecy, Soul, Islamic Philosophy. Al Ghazali, Ibn Rushd*

## 1. Introduction

Islamic Philosophy, a composition of Islam and Philosophy with its unique resources and methods, contains a variety of interesting topics and discussions. The adventure of Islamic philosophy, with its domestic and foreign sources, contains the rich products of thought created throughout the history of humanity<sup>1</sup>.

Islamic Philosophy has been a system of thought that is related to every philosophical subject. From Islamic perspective, Islamic philosophy articulates all issues that have been discussed throughout the history of philosophy; in other words, every issue that formed the background of philosophy is a topic of Islamic philosophy. Islamic Philosophy, in a sense, tries to explain knowledge, existence, and values as a system that tries to reveal the journey of thought among cultures, languages, and religions. While Islamic philosophers put forward their system and views, they used various evidence/proofs regarding the proof of Allah Almighty and the content of the soul and its state after death, which is especially related to religion. <sup>2</sup>It is generally accepted that, philosophy is a way of reason and intellect. By intellect we deduce, compare, and reach conclusions. Islamic philosophers, give us a heritage of both reason and religion combined these into a philosophical structure. They dealt with metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, politics, and linguistics.

If we look at technical knowledge aims at ensuring the use of objects for the good of man. Technology that is produced is the indicator of transformation of this knowledge into action. Artistic knowledge is also about presenting artistic products. The common point of all types of



knowledge is that they represent themselves on the basis of rational, empirical or intuition knowledge. Actions are both based on knowledge and transfer them onto the stage of action. Actions aren't totally ethical events, but all of the events can gain an ethical meaning under specific circumstances.

Philosophical knowledge is a unified knowledge which attempts to totally explain the universe and existence. There is certainly a purpose of philosophical knowledge. Just like the purpose of artistic knowledge – forming a work of art-, philosophical knowledge aims at a target.

Islamic viewpoint presents Adam (*'Alaih As-Salām*) as the first prophet. Allah Almighty taught Adam all the names (*The Holy Qur'ān*, (2:31). Adam (*'Alaih As-Salām*) thus learned the first codes of all knowledge. Besides the fact that there are/will be opponents of the below mentioned religious interpretation in terms of the history of Islamic thinking, Abu Hātimār-Rāzī (322/934) presents an interesting view in his work named *A'lāmu'n-Nubuwwah*. He criticizes the idea that the only way to reach knowledge by establishing the history of philosophy and religion on a rationalist resource is based on philosophical accumulation; he opposes the belief that the Greek philosophers of the First Age are the ones that put the books of mathematics, reasoning, medicine and astronomy at the disposal of humanity. According to him, humanity should be grateful to revelation and knowledge inherited from the prophets in terms of the principals and resources of philosophical sciences.<sup>3</sup>

For him, prophets are the real establishers of civilization as the actual teachers of mankind; philosophers are the heirs of prophets. According to, Abu Hātimār-Rāzī, Allah Almighty, enlightened prophets through revelation and endowed them wisdom. As prophets are the first teachers, their resource of knowledge about natural sciences is a revelation.

In al- Razi the share of Adam (*'Alaih As-Salām*) in transferring his knowledge he learned through revelation, to the next generations shouldn't be ignored. According to this starting point, there should be a first teacher. As it is impossible for a human being to create knowledge only on the basis of his personal reasoning and experience, there is a possibility that he acquired his knowledge from Allah Almighty through revelation. The first teachers are wise prophets; the following philosophical accumulation is basically based on the knowledge of prophets

The history of Islamic Philosophy involves the most remarkable examples of how the relationship between philosophy and religion is perceived throughout the history of Islamic thinking. Islamic philosophers have discussed the different dimensions of the relationship between the two significant domains. When Islamic thinkers met the



method of philosophical thinking, they interpreted religion and philosophy as two separate interpretations of the truth and attempted to compromise them. These attempts and ideas they developed improved reasoning in the world of Islam. The discussions and analyses about the relationship between philosophy and religion include the discussions about revelation-wisdom and faith-wisdom.

## **2. Research Methodology**

In this study, the issue of evidence was handled with an inductive and deductive approach. The deductive scientific literature in Islamic thought was subjected to a deconstructive analysis. We will discuss the dictionaries' definitions of the concept of evidence in the literature of Islamic thought. We will try to identify the common set of meanings of different concepts by tracing them.<sup>4</sup> The concept of evidence is essential to both epistemology and the philosophy of science.

In any event, the concept of evidence is inseparable from that of justification. When we talk of 'evidence' in an epistemological sense we are talking about justification: one thing is 'evidence' for another just in case the first tends to enhance the reasonableness or justification of the second. A strictly nonnormative concept of evidence is not our concept of evidence; it is something that we do not understand.<sup>5</sup>

In the light of the classical sources of *Kalām* and Islamic Philosophy, the debates and the diversity of the concepts will be examined. The nature of the relationship between religion and philosophy is discussed. The methodology to be followed while interpreting religious texts is classified. Specific to IbnRushd, the explanations are detailed.

## **3. Background**

In the background of the study, based on the definition of dogma, it is stated that Islamic thought is incompatible with the idea of dogma. Within the border of this article, the author tries to focus on whether the opinions in Islamic philosophy are dogmatic by taking the content and function of the evidence into consideration. In Islamic thought there are three essential paradigms; Islamic Theology (*kalām*) Islamic Philosophy (*al Falsafah*) and Islamic Mysticism (*Taşawwuf*) Each of them have a special language, method and understanding.

Islamic thought and the works on it provide '*ilm* (knowledge or learning) and *ma'rifah* (gnosis or esoteric knowledge) as terms that correspond to knowledge. Aim of Islamic thought is to equip man with power to show the supremacy of certain thoughts, ideas and deeds clearly specified by the reason and religion and to prove using words the



incorrectness of the things that are against these thoughts, ideas and deeds. In a more general sense, *Islamic thought* aims to save man from blind imitation (prohibited *taqlīd*) and endow him with exact, accurate, and unshakable faith (*īmān*). In this respect, it is a system designed to endowing people with knowledge.<sup>6</sup>

The word *dogma*, in the Platonic-Stoic tradition, refers to an opinion, doctrine, decision, moral or legal judgment that seems right to all. According to the Roman Catholic Church, *dogma* is the decisions that are revealed by God or declared by religious authorities<sup>7</sup>. The clearest example of religious dogma is in Plato's *Republic*. Plato mentions that one can speak of Allah Almighty in two ways: Firstly, Allah Almighty is good and the source of goodness. Secondly, Allah Almighty is real and unchangeable. Plato uses the word *dogma* in his *Laws* to mean true belief about gods.

According to Kant, a dogmatic point of view doesn't make a critical examination about the methods and principles on which a specific claim is based. In general terms, what is meant by *dogma* is accepting and adopting an idea or thought without questioning it. There are two dimensions of considering an idea as impenetrable, indisputable, and uncritical. The first dimension is based on the eye looking from outside and the second dimension is based on the eye looking from inside. The eye that evaluates the Islamic thinking from the outside stigmatizes it as dogmatic, and incorrect. On the other hand, the eye that evaluates Islamic philosophy within an Islamic frame considers its views as unquestionable, with a desire to enact an objective truth with a subjective disposition.<sup>8</sup>

#### 4. Research Objective

The aim of this article is to draw attention to the superficial interpretations of the views that characterize Islamic thought as dogma.

The issues analysed and discussed in Islamic Philosophy are approached in the light of reason and specific rational principles; they have been structured in a definite systematic manner within the scope of validity and consistency. Critical thinking, which is the general concern of philosophy, is also a basic principle of Islamic philosophy. Logic, which is the criterion that shows if a mind works correctly or not, is the *philosophy of the philosophy* with its functionality.

Islamic philosophers systematize their views with Greek philosophy on one hand and the *Holy Qur'ān* on the other as a source for evaluating divinity, prophecy, and the soul. They use various proofs along with the criteria of consistency required by the science of logic. Islamic philosophers design and present evidence to ground their views on a solid



basis and ensure acceptability. In this process, they pay attention to the most disciplined use of the basic principles and methods of the mind. They strive to the satisfaction of the critical structure of the human mind. They construct the evidence in terms of its existence.<sup>9</sup>

There are many concepts that characterize evidence and proof in Islamic thought. It will be useful to continue our analysis by making an evaluation on them. The diversity of these concepts has been the determinant of the intellectual richness of Islamic thought. The nuance of these concepts provided the opportunity to respond to every detail produced by the mind.

Conceptual richness in the fields of epistemology, ontology and ethics in Islamic thought increases reflection. Likewise, it is rich in concepts used in *al Ithbāt al-wājib*, *Ithbāt al Nafs* and *Ithbāt al Nubuwwah*.

## 5. Literature Review

While addressing a problem in Islamic thought, conceptual richness reveals the depth of the subject. Each concept itself points to a new opening.

It is necessary to focus on essential terms in Islamic thought to clarify the importance of the use of proofs. Etymologically, the word “*dalīl*” is an Arabic expression. It is used to express the guiding thing that leads to the correct judgment.<sup>10</sup> The term generally means “proof”; however, it is not limited to logical deduction. It also includes the meaning of reasoning based on analogy, Evidence<sup>11</sup>, which means the thing that leads to the truth was much discussed by the early theologians, and gained a logical content with al Ghazali (d.1111).

Al-Ghazali explained evidence as the unification of the two concluding premises. Al Jurcani (d.1413), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, (d.1210) consider the evidence as a means of proof. According to them, evidence leads to a conclusion and requires knowing something else. Evidence is a means of revealing the unknown. Evidence that leads a person to a judgment about something, positively or negatively, has a close relationship with the many concepts<sup>12</sup>.

The term *Madlūl* refers to the issue to be proved. Theologians emphasized the variability of the evidence, in a sense, emphasizing that *Madlūl* cannot be refuted by refuting the *dalīl/evidence*. While the evidence in the early theological literature has an empirical character, they are far from the frame of logic. Al Baqillani (d.1013) emphasized that if the evidence is disproved in the context of the *dalīl* and *madlūl* relationship, it would be wrong to prove it.<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, al Jurcani (d.1413) pioneered another approach and defended the falsehood of a claim that was not proven by evidence.



With al-Ghazali, the idea that the most accurate evidence is in the form of logical analogy was established in the world. In the history of theology, the evidence is divided into two; evidence based on reason and text in terms of the source of knowledge and evidence based on doubt in terms of the value of the result.

*Al Jadal* is derived from “*al jadlū*” and it means to bend the rope with force. It derives from the same root as “*jadīl*” meaning the thighs of the camel. The dictionary meaning of *jadal* is to twist the rope firmly, to be able to fight, to be determined. In the science of logic, *jadal* means analogy made up of famous and acceptable premises. It is the equivalent of the Latin word *dialectica*. *Al Jadal* is the art of showing contradictions in thought by discussing them. *Al Jadal* also includes a scientific meaning referring to the rules of discussion.<sup>14</sup>

Al Farabi (d.950) sees *al jadal* as a form of proof that is less than correct. It describes it as the art of trying not to adopt another thought that is contrary to a given answer or an accepted thought.<sup>15</sup> For Ibn Sīnā (d.1037), *al jadal* is the opposition, which is praised by the majority of scholars and designed to silence the opposite side in the debate with one of the appropriate ways.<sup>16</sup>

*Topics*, which is the fifth book of Aristotle’s logic corpus named *Organon*, tried to affect the basis of the Islamic philosophers’ approach as a frivolous science and method. Aristotle, in *Topics*, described dialectics as an analogy, concluding from probabilistic premises. Aristotle sees it as reasoning whose premises are generally accepted by almost everyone or philosophers. According to Kant, dialectics means the type of logic that shows errors or contradictions in the transcendental judgments that go beyond the limits of the common experiment.<sup>17</sup>

*Al Burhān*: This word, derived from the root *brh*, etymologically includes the meanings of clarity and shed some light on something. *Burhān* in the *Holy Qur’ān* is a concept synonymous with miracle. *Burhān* is a comparison of precursors consisting of definite comparison. *Burhān*, according to Ibn Sīnā, describes the comparison with certain propositions to obtain accurate knowledge.<sup>18</sup> Al Farabi named the last five books of the famous logic work of Aristotle, *Organon*, as *alburhan*,<sup>19</sup> in ancient and medieval philosophy, the evidence, based on the deduction of the intellect is called *al burhān*. In modern philosophy, both mental and experiential evidence is called *al burhān*. Among these arts, *al burhān*, as the kind of comparison that gives definite information, based on the exact knowledge, and experience, originating from senses. *Kalām*, philosophy and mysticism are based on different proofs as methods. Is there harmony or conflict in the nature of religious and rational proofs? It will be necessary to mention this subject as follow.



## 6. Discussion

*Kalām* and *fiqh* give importance to rational proofs; they give priority to text, that is, to certain, written verses. In these fields, it is possible to encounter the following determinations and quotations when a judgment and decision is made on a subject in both theology and *fiqh* tradition.

“...Allah Almighty states like that in *Holy Qur’ān*. So this word of Allah Almighty is certain for us. The verse is binding for us: Our reasoning is only authorized to seek the wisdom of this decree. Otherwise, our intellect cannot find an alternative to this verse.”

“..Our Prophet (*Ṣal Allāh-u-‘alaihe wa sallam*) said the following regarding this issue. His views are binding for us”.

.. “Imams and founders of *fiqh* schools of thought also determined these rules. Their opinions should also be taken into account.” “Our duty is to obey these opinions of them not to discuss”.

Although reason is a tool for a theologian or a jurist in the search of truth, wisdom, and causes of divine decrees, Islamic philosophers have been accused of designating reason as independent, value-maker, and determinant.

Arab, Persian, Turkish, Indian, Syrian, and Nasturi philosophers grew up in Islamic culture and geography and expressed their ideas freely. They highlighted the rational evidence with oral narrative tradition, which was the primary source of knowledge. The knowledge transferred through this tradition was evaluated with reasoning which is a natural activity of the human mind.<sup>20</sup>

In Islamic philosophy, rational and religious evidence is brought together and interpreted; it is a philosophy of presentation and criticism of evidence. On the other hand, philosophy in the most general sense is a search. It means having a critical mindset, not relying on what is available, and criticizing the evidence put forward. There are various rational proofs and reasoning processes used by Islamic philosophers. The *istidlāl* means the process of the mind used to obtain the unknown by analyzing the known; it is like the mind rising on a ladder step by step. There are various forms of *istidlāl* used by the Islamic philosophers in classifying their works and establishing their systems.<sup>21</sup>

In an environment where the religious text was dominant and considered unquestionable, philosophers studied different fields such as existence, knowledge, politics, and metaphysics and they established evidence based on observation, experiment, and deep thought with the mere operation of the mind. In general, the issue of whether rational and religious evidence is compatible in Islamic thought has been discussed



under headings such as *reason, revelation, wisdom, and shari'ah, philosophy, and religion*.<sup>22</sup>

Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328) in his works *Dar'at- ta'arud al-'Aql wa al-Naql* also called *Al-Muwāfāqa*, tends towards a reconciliation of reason and religious evidence. What he understands from rational evidence is the mind that adheres to and obeys the religious text.

Ibn Taymiyya voices this understanding as follows:

“We express Allah Almighty as He described Himself, or as the Prophet (*Ṣal Allah-u-'alaihe wa sallam*) described him. We understand next to previous predecessors without asking how and without resorting to analogy”<sup>23</sup>

Al Ghazali also gives priority to the religious text. Because of the principles in the text, he criticizes the pure rational views that he found incompatible with the text. His criticism of his predecessor, al Farabi and Ibn Sīnā's views and proofs on certain issues, gave rise to the *tahafut* tradition, which means a philosophy of evidence and criticism in Islamic thought. He was criticized then by Ibn Rushd's *tahafut*<sup>24</sup>. *Tahafut* is a word that contains the meanings of perpetuity, inconsistency, incoherence, destruction, and shedding. It seems that al- Ghazali opposes the ideas not merely because they are ideas, but because of the lack and inadequacy of the reasoning of evidence discussed while presenting these ideas.

Al Ghazali, examined the philosophers and their evidence under the title of “*Maqāsidu'l Falāsifah*” “Aims and purposes of Philosophers”, pointing out that before criticizing something, it is necessary to know the science, discipline, or view that is in question. He then accused the philosophers of covering up the truth, leaving religion in denial on three issues. He accused them of disintegrating religion through *bid'ah* (innovation) on eighteen points.

We can define *bid'ah* (Innovation) as follows; what is not included in the transport; In fact, we can also understand it as a new idea put forward through reason; to some extent, the bid includes being free and not feeling dependent on any narration. *Bid'ah* (Innovation which means to create something without precedence. *Bid'ah*, in Islam is , any innovation that has no roots in the traditional practice. Most Muslims, however, agreed that it was impossible to adapt to changing conditions without introducing some types of innovations. As a safeguard against any excesses, *bid'ahs* were classified as good (*hasan*) or praiseworthy or bad or blameworthy. Ghazali criticizes the evidence of some philosophers, especially Farabi and Ibn Sīnā, on three famous issues. However, he might have the right to find the opinions and evidence of those he criticized wrong from two sources.<sup>25</sup>



The first of these was the principles of the *Holy Qur'ān*, which he regarded as the absolute source of knowledge. The second principle was the necessity of using the science of logic for thinking properly and correctly.

Ibn Rushd in *Faslu'l Maqal* (Decisive Treatise & Epistle 'Dedicatory) and in *Al-Kashf* (the Exposition of the Methods of Proof Concerning the Beliefs of the Community), tried to reconcile *Sharī'ah* and Philosophy and to classify the understanding of evidence in Islamic thought.<sup>26</sup> In the first sentences of his work called *Faslu'l Maqal*, Ibn Rushd tries to place *Sharī'ah* on the rational ground. When he says " *Sharī'ah* invites to evaluate the existing knowledge with reason and search their knowledge in this way", he uses verses from the *Holy Qur'ān* to justify his opinion. He uses verses in the *Holy Qur'ān* that emphasize the importance of thinking, reasoning, and observation to justify *Sharī'ah* with rational proofs. To buttress his argument, he cited Holy Quranic verses such as "Learn a lesson, then, O you who are endowed with insight!" (59:2) and "So, do they not look at the camels how they are created, and at the sky, how it is raised high," (88:17–18)

Ibn Rushd says that the way to *Sharī'ah* and Allah Almighty is "*al Burhan, al hikmah*".<sup>27</sup> That's why he mentions that al Burhan and individuals who think like him should be carefully learned. Ibn Rushd believes that it is obligatory to think about beings by making rational comparisons.<sup>28</sup>

Ibn Rushd draws a picture for us to understand religious texts and their interpretation. The frame drawn by Ibn Rushd is as follows:

1. The First group of religious texts (*Holy Qur'ān* verses) has the characteristic of having only one specific meaning. There is no place for any interpretation because of the clarity and stability of its meaning. It's a great error to attempt to interpret them. Verses about the unity of Allah almighty. In the *Holy Qur'ān*, there are Ayat that are *Muḥkamāt*, entirely clear and plain, and these are the foundations of the Book which are plain for everyone. And there are *Āyāt* in the *Holy Qur'ān* that are Mutashabihat not entirely clear for many, or some people. Suratal-Ikhlās, is a sample of this group (There is nothing which is equal to Him)
2. This second group is divided into four different sub-groups:
  - a. Only the deeper scholar can penetrate the meaning of the illustrated text as formed by covered metaphors.
  - b. The text is quite easy to understand and is easily written. The average mind can easily grasp its meaning. It can easily be interpreted.



- c. It can easily be seen that some expressions are designed to be given as examples. But it is hard to predict where this similarity should be addressed. It is only interpretable by eminent and deeper scholars.
- d. It is quite clear that some texts are designed to create metaphors. Each side has a similarity, and the point of resemblance is clear. One should, consider and think about these texts.

According to Ibn Rushd, ordinary people are unable to comprehend theoretical subjects, or spiritual beings due to their limited intellect, ability, and nature. For these people, knowledge is limited to the five senses. Spiritual topics are needed to be explained for their mind by using examples and metaphors. Religious knowledge represents itself through examples.

At this point, we should pay particular attention to Ibn Rushd's essential question. "If the lawmaker is telling the truth why should it need to be interpreted? Couldn't he tell all of these instructions by using plain speech without using metaphors?"

Ibn Rushd dealing with different levels of human perception affirms that *Holy Qur'ān* verses carry an internal meaning besides an external one. He also has an open mindset. An example of this is his comparison how of a knife used for cutting animals (which have been made by non-Muslims) doesn't have any influence upon how effective it is for cutting. There is no harm according to him in learning sciences like logic, from foreigners. He compares a knife to logic from the standpoint of an instrument.

He sees *Sharī'ah* (Law) as a brother of philosophy. In speaking of the generation of *Sharī'ah*, he refers to metaphor. The *Sharī'ah*, for Ibn Rushd, heals souls just like a physician that heals the body.<sup>29</sup> As we have stated before, when al Ghazali criticized the evidence of philosophers, he acted based on the rational proofs. While Ibn Rushd was responding to al-Ghazali's criticism about previous philosophers, he starts with religious evidence and turns them into the interpretation. In short, although Ibn Rushd is a philosopher, he uses verses in his answer to al-Ghazali.

Ghazali puts people into four classes in terms of religion.

1. The first group involves people who believe in Allah almighty and the Prophet (*Ṣal Allah-u-'alaihe wasallam*). There is no need to talk to these people about the science of *kalām*.
2. The second group includes unbelievers,



3. The third group believes through hearsay (*khavar*) and imitation, for which *kalām* is useful. Since they cannot grasp the meaning of the word, they are in doubt.
4. In the fourth group, some people are perverted but very intelligent; *kalām* helps those like this.

Along with this classification, al-Ghazali says, "*Kalām* was not sufficient and healing for me."<sup>30</sup> In short, he also criticizes theology from many dimensions just like he criticizes the way philosophy is handled. Philosophy is an investigation. It is comparison and criticism. This is what al-Ghazali did. There is no doubt that Ibn Rushd was a philosopher, he also gave importance to religious verses and used them more in his answers to al-Ghazali. For example, he said, "*Then he turned straight to the sky, while it was smoke*" (*Holy Qur'ān*, 41:11). This verse indicates that heaven was created from a substance, and said, "The theologian should not regard himself above the sharia."

The scholars who opposed the philosophers do not even evaluate their evidence well; the evidence they try to put forward actually supports the philosophers, which is in contrast to their aim. The verse "*He is the One who created the heavens and the earth in six days, while His throne was on water*" (*Holy Qur'ān*, 11:7) clearly shows that before he created the earth, the throne and water existed. He emphasizes that, contrary to the approach above, wisdom and *Shari'ah* fundamentally share the same essence; in other words, they are two different expressions of the same reality. Moreover, religious texts and philosophical ideas are reconciled. Conflict arises because of the differences in the opinions of people and the way they show their evidence.

The perception of the human mind differs from person to person. In the *Holy Qur'ān*, 16:25, the method of pronouncement and invitation is stated as wisdom, good advice, and reason respectively. Then this classification is enriched and a connection between wisdom, *al hikmah*, and philosophy, good advice with Salafiyyah, and finally *al-Jādal* with *Kalām* is established. According to Ibn Rushd, the proof of Inaya, grace, which means that everything is created with care for human beings, and Proof of Ihtira, (Turkish word) which indicates the creation of existence and life, is often included in the *Holy Qur'ān*. Ibn Rushd determined this evidence based on reason, experience, intuition, and observation. Ibn Rushd also mentions that the evidence varies according to the people and scholars.<sup>31</sup>

Al Kindī reconciles reason and revelation in terms of their purpose; according to him, religious knowledge is more rational than philosophical knowledge. According to him, the revelation of the *Holy Qur'ān* can be



supported with rational proofs. Those who reject it would only be in a benign mind, that is, they deny that they cannot healthily evaluate the evidence.<sup>32</sup>

As we can see, Ibn Rushd tried to make a rational interpretation of religious issues. In a classification about the topic of evidence, Ibn Rushd identified five groups in his work titled *Al-Kashf al Manāhij al-Adillah fi 'Aqa'id al-Millah (the Exposition of the Methods of Proof Concerning the Beliefs of the Community)*. In particular, he identified four key sects as the targets of his discussion; the Asharites, Mutazilites, the Sufis, and the "literalists". He claimed that they all have distorted the scriptures and developed innovative doctrines not compatible with Islam. Ibn Rushd sees the evidence of the Ash'arī as inconsistent and unconvincing. He does not mention the views of Mu'tazilah much because he did not reach the Maghreb. After getting rid of lustful desires, people attain a skill inspired by the soul of Allah Almighty. Discovery is knowledge; in other words, it is intuition. They also take transportation as a basis, while the Batinites do not find transmitting and binding, although they follow a similar path through the Sufis.<sup>33</sup>

## 7. Conclusion

Reconciliation of philosophy and religion in Islamic philosophy is a reconciliation of philosophy and religious evidence. Whether reason, experience, and intuition should be taken as evidence or not has long been discussed and different schools have emerged defending different claims about the issue.

While establishing their systems, philosophers in Islamic philosophy have relied on both knowledge and the science of logic, in which there are various issues of discussion while processing their ideas.

The knowledge system of philosophers is based on reasoning. Their leading proofs are mind and sense. Although theologians and philosophers have similar characteristics in terms of reasoning, the basic purpose of theologians is to defend the Islamic beliefs and criticize the opponents of Islam. The purpose of Islamic philosopher, on the other hand, is to reach the truth; he aims to bring Islamic thoughts closer to the field of philosophy while on the other hand, he aims to bring the philosophic thoughts to the world of Islam.

Islamic thought is a civilization of knowledge, which also contains rich evidence. Those who mention that Islamic thought is a dogmatic system from time to time with prejudice seem to approach the issue with a perspective that is far from comprehensive analysis and composition. Our study shows that the *Holy Qur'ān*, which is the main source of Islamic thought, draws attention to rational, experiential, and intuitive



evidence. It invites humanity to common sense and expects us to rise from the level of imitation to the level of investigation.

It can be seen that the motivation behind the use of evidence in the system of Islamic philosophers can be divided into three categories. Firstly, some of the evidence is organized to illustrate and understand philosophical issues. Some of the evidence is created and formed by philosophers as they are critical and reasonable. In my opinion, another reason behind the importance of evidence in Islam is to show philosophical ability and originality. While establishing their thought systems and processing their ideas, philosophers have relied on both knowledge and the science of logic involving various argumentations

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- <sup>3</sup> Abū Hātim ar-Rāzī, *A'lāmu'n-nubuwwah* edited by Salāh es-Sāwī – Gulām Rızā A'vānī, (Tahran, n.p. 1397/1977) 4-76.
- <sup>4</sup> An inductive logic is a logic of evidential support. In a deductive logic, the premises of a valid deductive argument *logically entail* the conclusion, where *logical entailment* means that every logically possible state of affairs that makes the premises true *must* make the conclusion true as well. Thus, the premises of a valid deductive argument provide *total support* for the conclusion. An inductive logic extends this idea to weaker arguments. In a good inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some *degree of support* for the truth of the conclusion, where this *degree-of-support* might be measured via some numerical scale. By analogy with the notion of deductive entailment, the notion of inductive degree-of-support might mean something like this: among the logically possible states of affairs that make the premises true, the conclusion must be true in (at least) proportion of them—where is some numerical measure of the support strength. (<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/>) accessed on january 15, 2022
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<sup>11</sup> Achinstein, Peter, 1983, 'Concepts of Evidence,' in Achinstein (ed.) *The Concept of Evidence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: (1983;145–174)

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<sup>14</sup> Al Jurcani, *Sharḥ al- Mawāqif*, (I.140).

<sup>15</sup>Farabi. *al Macmu' /Ciaro*, 1325/1907,61);

<sup>16</sup>İbnSînâ, *eş-Şifa, Kitabü'l-Cadal*, I, 23. In Islamic thought many books carry name of al Jadal see. Al Maturidi, *Kitabu'lJadal*; Ka'bi, *al jadalveadabüahlîhi*; al Juveyni, *al Kafîyefi'ljadal*; al Ghazali, *al Muntahalfi'ilmî'lJadal*; Erdem, Engin. "İbn Sina'nın Metafizik Delili". Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 52 (2011 ): 97-119; Gülaçar,İzzet, *İbn Sina'nın Tabiat Felsefesinde Hareket*, (Unpublished Phd. Dissertation,Ankara University Graduate School of Social Sciences,2021)

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<sup>19</sup> Fārābī, *ihsa' al-'ulum.*, 26-29.

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