THE MUSLIM REAWAKENING IN THE 19TH CENTURY PAK-HIND SUB-CONTINENT: AN OVERVIEW

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Abstract

The fall of Delhi in 1857 and the rise of the British colonialism to power in the subcontinent shattered the confidence and self-understanding of the Muslim community. Those who ruled huge territory for around eight centuries were suddenly reduced to a religious minority, observed suspiciously by the British colonialists. The question how it happened and why it happened kept the Muslims community for a while confused. But gradually it started to think how they lost their glory. During this period even some well informed and well-meaning Muslim leaders thought there was no future and it was better for them to emigrate to a more safe and peaceful place to avoid humiliation and discrimination. Muslims were politically, socially, economically, and culturally marginalized. At the same time, the Christian missionaries and orientalists started an intellectual crusade. Their main target were the sources of inspirations of Muslims namely *The Holy Qur'ān (Ṣal Allah-u-'alaihe wa sallam)* Missionaries as well as orientalists questioned the validity, relevance and authority of both the sources in a so called age of science and reason. Muslims' response to this missionary and orientalist's intellectual invasions was prompt. Scholars like Rahmanullah Keranvi, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Syed Amir Ali and Shibli Naʻmani, to mention only a few, responded in their own ways. Syed Amir Ali and Shibli in particular tried through an interpretation of the Muslim history, to prepare a ground for revival of Muslim thought and the community. This overview offers a few preliminary observations as a background to the Muslim awakening in the 19th century Pak-Hind sub-continent. This discussion leads us to a more detailed review of the contribution

of Sayed Amir Ali and Shibli Na'mani in the intellectual revival of Muslim thought and the Muslim community in the subcontinent.

Key words: *ummah, khilāfah, taqlīd, jihād, ijtihād*

1. Introduction

With the fall of Delhi in September 1857 at the hands of the British colonialists, a world of illusions in which the Muslims of the sub-continent had been living for about a century came to an abrupt end. The Muslim encountered a new crisis, one they had never faced in the subcontinent before. Crises and deadlocks, it is said, have at least one advantage: they force people to think. The crisis Muslims faced in the subcontinent not only called for a re-assessment of their national strategies but also provoked them to rediscover their real identity in the context of a fast-changing political scenario. The challenge was unique and unprecedented.

Since its success in the Battle of Plassey (1757), the East India Company emerged as an ascending colonialist power in the subcontinent. The writ of the Mughal emperor, though still a figurehead, did not extend beyond the confines of Delhi. Yet many Muslims, living in a world of illusion, thought, even as late as the 1820's, that *"the English company acted as the servant and 'Diwan' of the House of Timur"*.[1]

The disillusionment was traumatic. At first, pessimism prevailed. Many Muslims even thought of migrating from India to far-off places such as Makkah. Hali[2] tells us that at one point Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), the well-known educationist and reformer, decided to migrate to Egypt, though he later changed his mind, but even a mass migration could not have solved the problems Muslims were facing at individual and national levels. At the individual level, the problems were mostly economic, cultural and psychological and at the national level, the problems were more varied and more serious. We will like to divide our review of the major problems faced by the Muslims in the sub-continent into two parts. First, we will review the political and religious condition of the Muslim *ummah* (community) in the pre-modern period, which ended with establishment of *Khilāfat* in Peshawar in 1824. Second, we will review the political, social, economic, and religious issues Muslims faced after 1824.

2. Discussion

2.1 Political and Religious Condition of the Muslims in Pre-Khilāfat of the Peshawar Period

2.1.1 Political Instability

By the beginning of the 18th century, the Mughal Empire in the subcontinent was showing visible signs of decay and disintegration. With the death of Alamgir in 1707, a war for succession to the throne began in the house of Timur. The internal division and disunity, coupled with the devastating sack of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739, left the capital city torn and bleeding. Other major cities and provinces fared no better. The East India Company, initially a commercial enterprise but now becoming a claimant to the throne of Delhi, benefited most from this situation. With the frequent uprisings of the Marathas and other non-Muslim provincial rulers it was more or less writing on the wall that the Mughals have lost their power. But who was to fill this vacuum? If Ahmad Shah Abdali had not broken the strength of the Marathas in June 1761, they would have been the obvious successors to the Mughals. However, it was the British imperialists who filled this vacuum. The qualitatively inferior armies of the Mughals were defeated by the well-disciplined, organized, and technologically superior British troops, but Muslims in general and the religious intelligentsia in particular did not accept defeat, at least in their hearts. A contemporary observer might have explained this self-understanding as a last excuse of wounded vanity as an escape into unreality, yet this very spirit of resistance contained the seeds of reassertion. After a short interlude of apparent quiet, the Muslim response to the new situation articulated itself. What were its characteristics and effects? How far was it successful? This needs to be properly examined.

2.1.2 Religious Oppression against the Muslim

Islam entered India in the early part of the 8th century C.E. through different channels, In general, early Arab settlers, traders, and frequent expeditions from Persia and Ottoman empire introduced Islam to this new soil. The most significant contribution, however, was made by the *Sufi* orders. These *Sufi* orders, originating in Baghdad, Quniyah, Shiraz, and Isfahan, were mostly influenced by the *waḥdat al wujūdi* doctrines (i.e., an essential unity in all creations). Significant efforts were made by Muslim thinkers to bring the Islamic train of thought in line with tradition. Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, popularly known as Mujaddid Alif Thani (1563-1624), and Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1703-1763) tried to revive Islam on its traditional foundations. If not in their own time, at least in the following generations, the effects of their efforts became visible. This internal religious crisis was further intensified after the fall of Delhi in 1857 by conflicts between the interests of the Muslim population and that of the British administrators.

To show the full fury of "victory," British Prime Minister Palmerston (1784-1865) wrote to Lord Canning, Governor General of India, that "every civil building connected with Mohammedan tradition (an oblique reference to the Jami' Masjid Delhi) should be levelled to the ground without regard to antiquarian veneration or artistic predilection".[3] A British historian Peter Hardy reports that the grand mosque of Shah Jahan somehow escaped demolition, but for five years no Muslim was allowed to pray in it.[4] He further states that the mosque was used as a stable for the horses of the victorious British troops. The Akbarabadi Mosque, however, where Shah Wali Allah of Delhi had taught was levelled to the ground.[5] The Fatehpuri Masjid, in Delhi, remained in the custody of the colonizer until 1875.[6] The central royal library, founded by Babur in 1526, with thousands of valuable volumes and manuscripts, was looted and destroyed. These and similar incidents of religious oppression at the hands of the British rulers exasperated Muslims and intensified their reaction to the British rule.

Muslim responses to this political and religious crisis were soon to erupt. Some responses were violent, while others were more sophisticated and philosophical. Hardly half a century had passed after the death of Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (d. 1763) when a radical movement for the revitalization and purification of faith arose from the house of Shah Wali Allah. It was mainly a movement for socio-religious reform, but since its major objective was the establishment of an Islamic state in the northwestern frontier area of the Subcontinent, it soon developed into an activist movement.

The movement became significant and influential for two main reasons. First, persons such as Shah Isma'il, a grandson of Shah Wali Allah, and Maulana Abd al Hayy, son-in-law of Shah 'Abd al Aziz (1746-1823), were among its leaders. Shah 'Abd al 'Aziz himself is reported to have endorsed through a *fatwa,* and recommended the movement to his followers. When Syed Ahmad of Bareilly announced his intention to wage a war (*jihād*) against the Sikh oppressors in the northwestern frontier, Shah 'Abd al Aziz gave his own mantle and turban (*'imāmah*) to Syed Ahmad as a mark of his approval and full support. He wanted to participate personally in the *jihād*, but, due to old age, could not do so.

Second, the actual program adopted by the movement was of great significance. As a movement for social reform, it tried to correct the practice of prohibition of second marriages of widows, similarly the high cost of marriage, unnecessary and lavish expenditures on birth and burial ceremonies resulting from adoption of many Hindu customs by the Muslims. On the religious level the movement tried to correct many *Sufi* practices which violated the *Sharī'ah*, such as prostrating oneself before the graves of "holy persons." Or the exaggerated reverence paid to the

Sufi teacher which approximated worship. Similar practices existed in other parts of the Muslim world. Attempts were made by persons such as Muhammad B. Abd al Wahhab (1703-1787) of Najd to call Muslims back to the path of *The Holy Qur'ān* and the *sunnah*.

Syed Ahmad's call for *jihād* against the Sikh oppression and for the establishment of an Islamic state on the pattern of the *Khilāfah al Rāshidah* (the rightly guided caliphate) was well-received all over the subcontinent. Although Syed Ahmad and Shah Isma'il succeeded in breaking the Sikh power and establishing *Khilāfah* in Peshawar, the movement did not last too long. With the martyrdom of both leaders in 1831 in a battle with the Sikh troops, the whole movement collapsed. It did, however, survive at an ideological level in various parts of the subcontinent. The *mujāhidīn* movement continued surreptitiously in parts of the country, particularly in Bengal, Bihar, and the United Provinces. The influence of the followers of Syed Ahmad and Shah Isma'il was evident on the resistance movements of Bengal, the *Farā'iḍi* movement, focusing on economic justice and religious freedom for the Muslims.

The *mujāhidīn* movement had a tremendous impact on the overall history of Islam in India. But our concern here is confined to the effects of its failure which contributed much to the political and religious confusion facing the Muslim community in the 19th century.

A general pessimism prevailed after the fall of the *mujāhidīn* at Balakot in 1831. For the Muslim community, the disintegration of the dream of an Islamic state was as frustrating as the fall of Delhi later in 1857. It added further to the problems faced by Muslims in the subcontinent.

With this brief overview of the situation in which the Muslims found themselves in 19th century India, we like to review the major problems besetting them, in the political, economic, social and religious domains.

2.2 Political Problems

Muslims ruled India for around eight centuries. Developing an efficient system of government and a rich culture, they succeeded in ruling efficiently as large a country as the whole of Western Europe. It was a proof of the viability of their social, economic and administrative systems. Perhaps Luke Scrafton was not exaggerating when he called it the best-administered government in the world in the 18th century C.E.[7] Sidney Owen was more moderate in his comment: "Whatever its defects, it was ... a grandly-conceived, well-adjusted and beneficent structure of government." [8]

The political infrastructure of the empire, however, was not broad-based. Islamic political institutions such as *Khilāfah* (caliphate), *shūra* (mutual and broad-based counseling), *al Amr bi al Ma'rūf wa, nahī 'an il Munkar* (enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil) were with rare exceptions (e.g. Alamgir), were never introduced or established in the empire. Those who ruled did so because of their personal charisma or due to support from the army and certain interest groups. Consequently, when the fall of the Mughal Empire took place, Muslims had no political organization or institutions through which they could regain their political strength. Therefore, the fall of Delhi left the Muslims in a political void.

Another pertinent political question was for the Muslims how to relate to the new imperial power. Un-Islamic groups, such as the Qadiani or Ahmadis, offered the view that, as Islam stipulated submission to the authority of the ruler, the Muslims should accept the British rule as legitimate and cooperate with it. They invoked one part of a verse of *The Holy Qur'ān* in support of their view, suggesting that *The Holy Qur'ān* says, "…(*obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you*) (*The Holy Qur'ān* 4:59). In its proper context the verse does not mean obedience to imperialism or to an un-Islamic rule. The full verse reads as follows:

> *"O you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. Then, if you quarrel about something, revert it back to Allah and the Messenger, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is good, and the best at the end."* (4:59)

The Muslims of the subcontinent were not convinced by the Qadiani position. They were convinced that the Qadianis had consciously distorted the meaning of the Quranic verse.

Another argument advanced by this school of thought was that as long as the foreign rulers did not interfere in "religious" practices, such as *ṣalah* (prayer), *ṣiyām* (fasting), *zakah* (obligatory spending), and *ḥajj* (pilgrimage), one should not fight against them. But this argument was equally rejected by the Muslims because Islam had taught that political life is an integral part of Muslim's life. Efforts were also made to convince Muslim masses that *jihād* was no longer valid. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian (d. 1908), having declared himself a *messiah*, announced " ... from now on whosoever shall raise the sword for the sake of religion and slay the infidels by proclaiming himself to be a *ghāzi*, he will be a disobedient rebel of Allah Almighty and His Prophet *(Ḥaḍrat Muhammad Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu 'alaihi wa 'alā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Ṣallam)*." He also said, "I believe that as my followers increase, the believers in the doctrines of *jihād* will decrease.

For accepting me to be the Messiah and Mahdi itself means the rejection of the doctrine of *jihād*".[9] These statements were meant to discourage Muslim resistance against British power. It was natural that the Muslim masses regarded these views contrary to *The Holy Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah*, deviant and totally *bāṭil*, and *kufr* (faithless). The Qadiani position was the antithesis of what the *Fara'iḍiyah* held. The *Farā'iḍiyah* (a Muslim revivalist movement and an extension of the *mujāhidun* movement in Bengal) refused to recognize the rule as legitimate in India. Instructing its followers to avoid even filing law suits in British courts, it tried to challenge authority of British imperialism at all levels.

A question often raised by the Muslims of the subcontinent was whether the whole subcontinent was a *dār al ḥarb* (abode of war) or a *dār al Islam* (abode of Islam). According to the Ḥanafi School of Law, a land may be declared *dār al ḥarb* if three conditions are present: first, suppression of basic Islamic tenets; second, absence of any protection for the Muslims and those *dhimmis* who were previously protected by the Muslim state; and third, existence of a threat, from a neighbouring state, to the national security of the Muslim state. The *Farā'iḍiyah* had, for these reasons, declared the subcontinent a *dār al ḥarb*. The political implications of regarding the subcontinent *dār al ḥarb* were significant. If it were an abode of war it shall be a religious obligation of Muslims not only in the subcontinent, but all over the world, to fight against the British and liberate the Muslims. This was precisely the fear of W. W. Hunter when analyzing the notion of *dār al ḥarb* in India with special reference to Bengal, he concluded that the declaration of *dār al ḥarb* was a necessary pre-requisite for *jihād* (war in Islam) .[10]

If India was not *dār al ḥarb* and armed struggle was not necessary for the liberation of the Muslims, then what peaceful course of action should be adopted by them? What were major Muslim responses to these questions? An effort will be made to review some of these responses.

2.3 Economic Problems

Significant developments had taken place in the economy of the subcontinent during the Mughal rule. The Mughal rulers, Akbar (d. 1605) and Jahangir (d. 1627), showed a personal interest in the development of trade and industry in the country. Jahangir, while governor of Gujrat in 1618, had issued a *farmān* (declaration) providing facilities to British traders in India. This opened new channels of trade. Soon, goods manufactured under the Mughals were in high demand in the markets of Europe, the Near East, and Africa. British and Portuguese shippers were highly instrumental in expanding over-seas trade. It is interesting to note

that until the 18th century India was a major exporter of finished products such as cotton cloth, sugar, woolen and silk cloth, yarn, sealing wax, indigo, spices, opium, and various drugs. Imports were limited to mainly luxury goods for the aristocracy--European wines, chinaware, precious stones, amber, perfumes and gold.

Akbar promoted the textile and weaving industries. Incentives were provided to technicians from Kashmir, Persia and Ottoman empire to settle in India and manufacture carpets, shawls and silk and woolen cloth. Soon, Lahore, Agra, Fatahpursikri, Ahmadabad, and Dacca began to compete in silk and woolen cloth with any other markets in the world. Referring to the silk and cotton cloth industry in Bengal, Berneir says,

> "There is in Bengal such a quantity of cotton and silk that the kingdom may be called the common storehouse for these two kinds of merchandise, not of Hindustan or the empire of the Great Mughal only, but of all the neighbouring kingdoms and even of Europe."[11]

Besides textile and weaving industries, the Mughal era was known for craftsmanship in leatherwork, ceramics, and shipbuilding. Chittagong specialized in building ships and had buyers as far away as Istanbul. But in the age of decline and disintegration in the Mughal empire, the economy, too, started falling apart. This was due to five major causes.

First, an important change was taking place in the European economy. With mass production and the use of mechanization in industry, Indian-manufactured goods were losing the European market. Now there was more demand for raw materials than for finished products. To keep the newly mechanized industries in Europe going, raw cotton, wool, and silk yarn were needed. Due to mass scale production and cut down in labour costs, European producers offered goods at a competitive price, causing a decline in the Mughal exports. Unfortunately, instead of using economic measures to increase their exports (thus expanding their economy) the British rulers of India sought to destroy indigenous industries and, as such, drive competitors out of business. This happened particularly with the silk and cotton industry of Dacca. Consequently, this thriving industry collapsed. This happened at a time when the Mughal Empire was breathing its last and the Mughal king was virtually under house arrest in Delhi. As a result, the Mughal crown was powerless to correct the situation.

Second, for centuries, banking and accounting had been a Hindu monopoly. This had significant political and economic implications for the Muslims. During the period of Mughal decline, Hindu bankers often extended huge financial support to their favorites in Muslim wars of succession. During Mughal rule 'stipends' and financial assistance was

available to needy Muslims. The British government discontinued this practice, leaving Muslims at the mercy of the Hindu moneylenders.

Third, the British rulers made it a point to discharge all the employees of the Mughals in order to employ those whom they trusted. These soldiers were dependent totally on stipends. They had no un-employment insurance or other source of income. Termination of their service was not only an economic problem--it also had its moral and social implications.

Fourth, due to a suspect status of the Muslims, the British were reluctant to employ Muslims in their administration. The Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, John Lawrence (1811-79), wrote to Governor General Lord Canning (1812-62), "The Mahommedans of the Regular Cavalry when they have broken out have displayed a more active, vindictive and fanatic spirit than the Hindus but these traits are characteristic of the race" (emphasis ours).[12] Mostly, the doors of employment were closed to Muslims. In some situations they were admitted in lower grades, but the higher executive positions were rarely available to them. In 1856, out of 366 persons listed as holding positions in the Bengal Revenue Service, only 54 were Muslims, and they, too, filled lowest positions in the service.[13]

Fifth, soon after gaining control over the country, the British rulers reviewed and screened those lands distributed among *Manṣabdārs* and *Jāgīrdārs* by the Mughal rulers. Those title holders suspected of having collaborated against the British in the war of independence in 1857 were deprived of their estates. A redistribution of land was carried out based on a person's loyalty to the British. This caused further dislocation and economic oppression for the Muslims.

2.4 Social Problems

Muslim society under the Mughals was already on the decline when British imperialism established itself in the subcontinent. One major social problem related to the status of women in society. In Hindu culture, women had no independence. There was a limited place for freedom of will. Islam on the contrary provided personal freedom and independence to women. But in its Indian surrounding many Islamic teachings were not fully implemented. Consequently, women lagged behind in education and social life. One obvious effect was deprivation of certain rights granted by Islam such as the right to inheritance or right to re-marriage when widowed or divorced. However, almost unknown to Indian culture, *ḥijāb* (covering the whole body except hands and face) was strictly observed, and segregation between sexes was maintained. Marriages were usually arranged by parents or friends of the bride and

the bridegroom. Family structure in general was broad-based, parents, as well as close blood relatives, were regarded as part of the family.

The traditional education system could net help the Muslims in acquiring openings in the British administration. This caused not only a serious economic problem but also social concern among educated Muslims.

A psychological impact of the ascending western culture was that, in general, the Western lifestyle was being imitated. Muslim cultural manifestations--dress, architecture, food habits, even house hold objects such as domestic utensils were changing the traditional Muslim style to that of the Western style.[14]

2.5 Religious Conditions

The Muslim community in the subcontinent was also facing serious ideological problems. One was, the fear of proselytization by the Christian missionaries actively working in the subcontinent. The British occupation of India was interpreted by the Christian missionaries as a victory for their faith.[15] In 1813, by an act of Parliament, the propagation of Christianity by the Christian missions was legally allowed.[16] Christian missions from England, U.S.A., and Canada became active in the colony. Though statistically, not many converts were won by way of polemical and theological discourses, many Indians were won over by the Christian missionaries through their social and welfare programs. Medical aid and distribution of canned food, milk, and other items were used as forms of persuasion.[17]

Christian missionary activities, irrespective of their success, posed a challenge to the Muslims. Without going into details about the nature and effects of this confrontation of faiths, we only want to show that fear of proselytization was a genuine religious problem for the Muslims.[18]

A comparatively minor religious problem came from the neighbouring faiths of Hinduism and Sikhism. Although Hinduism as a *dharma* (creed) was not a missionary faith, certain Hindu sects such as Chaitaniya of Bengal were involved in missionary activities. The *Ārya samāj* movement, too, had its effect in various parts of the subcontinent.[19] In the Punjab, particularly, Arayans succeeded in converting some Muslims of rural areas to Hinduism. Similarly, Sikhism was very active in the northwestern frontier area and the Punjab. Mass conversions from Islam to Sikhism had taken place in the Punjab, and this was sufficient to alarm Muslim thinkers.

Internally, the Muslim community was facing four major issues. First, a distorted understanding of religion and *madhab* (interpretation of law) existed among the masses. Second, popular *Sufism* was widespread. Third, a mythical understanding of history prevailed among the Muslims. Fourth, due to the inadequacy of the religious education system, the graduates produced by it were failing to keep up with the demands of changing times. In the following, we shall elaborate on these four issues and review Muslim responses to them.

2.5.1 Distorted Understanding of Religion

The centuries-old decay and stagnation had produced a particular brand of orthodoxy in some *ulama*, they were totally unaware of any social change since the fall of Baghdad in 1258 C.E. This introvert approach led, in the main, to the preservation of the intellectual heritage of the past. Consequently, an idealistic vision of the glories of the past alienated them from the realities of the present. Preservation of the traditional religious sciences *per se* might be commendable, but it offered no solutions to the emerging problems of the Muslims. One of its obvious drawbacks was that a significant number of those persons who had basic religious knowledge and who could be of great help in day-to-day economic, political, educational, and social problems simply withdrew from active life. This created, a vacuum and indirectly helped in the process of secularization and westernization of society.

Mughal culture was not entirely Islamic, though it did contain Islamic elements. With the exception of ʿAlamgir's reign (1659-1707), a distinction between the realm of the religious and the realm of the secular prevailed in it.[20] This was opposed to pristine Islamic thinking. In Islam, life is a composite whole, a unity, and a totality. Political activism is no less sacred than religious devotions. In Islam, Iqbal observed, all is sacred, the whole of this earth is like a mosque.[21] It is virtually impossible for a Muslim to retire from "this worldly" into the "other worldly", leaving this world at the mercy of the forces of unbelief and evil. A Muslim must maintain a balance and moderation in his actions.

The fundamental doctrine of *Tawḥīd* (uniqueness and transcendence of Allah Almighty) implies a conscious and total acceptance of one's ethical responsibilities in every aspect of life. A Muslim is asked to pray for *ḥasanat fi al dunya* (Almighty Allah's bounty in this world) as well as for *ḥasanat fi al ākhirah* (Almighty Allah's bounty in the life hereafter).

The idea of the **holy**, sacredness in space and time, has no place in Islam. *Ḥarām* (literally, prohibited) is an ethical category. It is *niyyah* (intention) and not necessarily the object in itself that makes a normally

permissible volitional activity prohibited. Once *niyyah* is made for *ṣalah* (prayer), or for *ṣaum* (fasting), or for *ḥajj* (pilgrimage) respectively, talking, eating, sex, and use of violence, which are not *ḥarām per se*, become temporarily prohibited. Violation of these prohibitions is ethically wrong but not a total catastrophe. To define political, economic, or social activities as worldly or secular pursuits and formal worship and rituals as religious duties was a clear deviation from the pristine Islamic belief contained in *The Holy Qur'ān* and the *sunnah*.

Similarly a gross misunderstanding existed about the authority of legal interpretations or *madhab*(s). The Muslims of the subcontinent were predominantly *ḥanafi*. A basic characteristic of the *ḥanafi fiqh* (school of law founded by Abu Hanifah, 80-150 H.) was its elasticity, flexibility, and rationalism (*Ra'y*). But it soon became known for the *taqlīd-e-jāmid* (blind following) of its jurists. In the 18th century, Aurangzib Alamgir recognized the need to reformulate the *fiqhi* (legal) positions. A committee of experts in Islamic law was appointed and, after thorough study, a code known as *Fatāwa i 'Alamgir* was prepared. The dilemma, however, was that posterity took the *Fatāwa as* a compendium capable of solving questions never envisioned by its original compilers. Being aware of the need for reformulation of *fiqhi* position, Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1707-1763) called for *Ijtihād*, a fresh deduction of law based on the Islamic principles (*uṣūl al Fiqh*). It was this same yearning for revival and reform which later manifested itself in the efforts of persons such as Iqbal and Mawdudi. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, the rigidity, non-flexibility, and *taqlīd* of the *'ulama* (scholars) was common.

2.5.2 Popular *Sufism*

Popular *Sufism*, due to its effects on the common man as well as on the elite, was a major problem. For the elite, pantheism, a dominant trend in *Sufism*, had great attraction. For one, coming from Indian religious tradition, *Sufi* expositions based on the pantheistic ideas of some famous sufis had a close resemblance to Upanishadic pantheism.[22] According to Upanishadic thought, the relationship between the "real" and the "non-real" was like the relationship between a drop of water and an ocean, or between a pinch of salt and a glass of water. When one dissolves and disappears into the other, it achieves existence as well as non-existence. Consequently, the pantheistic understanding of Allah Almighty was that He was in everything and everything was in Him. Its natural effect was that *Sufism* developed a tolerance for even pre-Islamic practices and ideas. Intent and not action became the main concern for the *Sufis*.

Popular *Sufism* encouraged the cult of saint worship. *Sufi* utterances, while in a state of spiritual ecstasy,[23] were taken as being no less authentic than *The Holy Qur'ān* or the *sunnah*. Simple teachings of *The Holy Qur'ān* and the sunnah were often interpreted in allegorical, esoteric, and mysterious language.

It was in this atmosphere that Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1563-1624) waged a war against popular Sufism, just as Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) did in his own time. Shaikh Ahmad attacked the very basis of the popular Sufi doctrines: viz. the doctrine of *waḥdat al wujūd* (existential unity), implying union with and union in Allah Almighty. He declared that "Allah Almighty is not and cannot be one with anything. Allah Almighty is Allah Almighty and world is world."[24] He rejected the pantheistic claims that One is present in everything, or that the Creator is incarnate in everything in the cosmos. His basic thesis was that One Who is transcendent cannot be unified with the finite. Therefore, *waḥdāniyah* (oneness) of Allah Almighty means uniqueness in His existence and in His attributes. No one can share in His existence or attributes. No *ṭarīqah* (path) leading to *maqāmāt* (stations) or *aḥwāl* (states) can lead to unity with the Ultimate Truth.

2.5.3   Mythical Understanding of History

The pantheistic and popular mysticism was common among Muslims in the 19th century. India was coupled with a mythical understanding of history in which heroes were glorified and sanctified in no less vigorous a manner than the practice of saint worship in popular Hinduism. Myth, according to Mircea Eliade, "narrates a sacred history, it relates an event that took place in primordial time, the fabled time of the beginnings. In other words, myth tells how, through the deeds of supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole reality, the cosmos, or only a fragment of reality--an island, a species of plant, a particular kind of human behaviour and institutions."[25]

Islam, since its beginning, has claimed to be a historic religion. It traced its origin from the historic figure of Sayedna Ibrahim (*'Alaih As-Salām*) the Hebrew patriarch and Sayedna Isma'il (*'Alaih As-Salām*). The life of prophet Muhammad *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu 'alaihi wa 'alā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Sallam)* was defined by *The Holy Qur'ān* as life of a non-mythical person whose humanity was his basic characteristic and who was differentiated from others only in his apostlehood. ''*Say, Surely, I am but a human being like you; it is revealed to me that your God is the One God.*" (*Al-Kahf* 18: 110; *Ha Mim al-Sajdah*, 41: 6). The birth, ministry, and death of the prophet was not supernatural. Islam did not assign any sanctity (or holiness) to any

particular point in space or time. Consequently, the Islamic calendar was counted not from the day the Holy prophet Muhammad *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu 'alaihi wa 'alā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Ṣallam)* was born or passed away but from the time a new social, religious, and economic order was established in al Madinah in the thirteenth year of the prophet's ministry, or the first year of the *Hijrah*.

Quantitatively, the number of respectable histories, auto-biographies, personal diaries, court chronicles and travelogues written in India during the Sultanate or Mughal periods with accuracy and precision is remarkable. But when the life of the Holy prophet Muhammad *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu 'alaihi wa 'alā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Ṣallam)* or his companions or of the Sufis was to be written, a totally different approach was adopted in many cases. These biographies were loaded with narratives of all kinds of supernatural acts, which made their application difficult if not impossible for a common man. The traditional Islamic approach to history was basically factual. Muslim historians in early and medieval Islamic history had a tradition of ascertaining the historical facts, comprehending and interpreting those facts in terms of their relevance to the present and future. For them, history was a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, "an unending dialogue between the present and the past."[26]

But in the 18th and 19th centuries, historical writing, particularly religious history, was overshadowed by mythical literature. We shall see later how Muslim historians and thinkers responded to this situation.

2.5.4   Inadequacy of the Religious Educational System

The system of religious education existing in the subcontinent was originally designed by Mulla Nizam al Din (d. 1161 H). With minor changes in the content, his curriculum was used for over a century. Mulla Nizam al Din had developed his own way of teaching in which his curriculum only helped a student to comprehend the issues and problems. Those who followed him adopted his curriculum while disregarding the method of teaching. Consequently, the textbooks prescribed in courses became the main objects of study.[27] Students often memorized difficult passages and commentaries on those passages. As a result, many of them were often equipped with solutions to the given problems and issues but did not know how to use that information in solving new problems. This was a major defect of the prevailing educational system.

Another problem of religious education was lack of due emphasis on Arabic literature, grammar and syntax. Consequently, many graduates of religious academies were unable to appreciate the beauty and excellence of *The Holy Qur'ān* and *hadith*. Indeed, their curriculum

included subjects such as *tafsīr* (exegesis), *fiqh* (law), *'ilm al Hadith* (science of *hadith*), but in *tafsīr*, for example, only selections from *The Holy Qur'ān* were explained to them in some academies. Even when in some academies the whole of *The Holy Qur'ān* was taught, it was taught with the help of *tafāsīr* (plural of *tafsīr*) like *Tafsīr al Jalalayn* which according to some researchers did not provide the necessary details for understanding, the relevance of *The Holy Qur'ān* to the practical problems faced by them.

        Another major defect in the religious education system was that in *'ilm al kalām* (scholastic theology) the problems discussed, and the texts used by the teachers were adopted from early classics of *'ilm al kalām*. These were produced by Muslim scholars to counter the influence of Greek thought. In the 19th century the issues and challenges that faced the world in general and the Muslims of the sub-continent in particular had changed, the *'ilm al kalām* was still obsessed with the issues of an earlier age. Some academies continued to relish in debates of the bygone and were engaged in what could be described as futile. Consequently, graduates of these religious educational institutes were unable to counter intellectual challenges and problems posed by modern skeptic and agnostic philosophies. However some graduates were quite able to do so.We have mentioned only a few of the problems that suffered under traditional education system in the subcontinent.

3. Response

3.1 A General Muslim Response

        By the beginning of the 20th century Muslim scholars realized that the greatest need of Muslim India was re-establishment of an Islamic social order.   However, they disgraced on details and in their priorities.

        For the 18th century theologian Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1703-1762), the field of *uṣūl al fiqh* (Principles of law making) enjoyed top priority. Although he had a mature political sense and would personally have founded a political party,[28] had health and age permitted, he nevertheless focused mainly on legal issues such as *ijtihād*[29] (analogical legal deduction), *uṣūl al taṭbīq*[30] a methodology for reconciliation in schools of *fiqh* , and '*ilm asrār al Dīn*[31] the wisdom in Islamic injunctions).

        Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703-1787), a contemporary of Shah Wali Allah of Delhi, focused more on the purification of *al 'aqīdah* (faith) and on its translation in a new economic and social order based on *Tawḥīd* (oneness and uniqueness of Allah Almighty). The *Ikhwān*

(brotherhood) communities established by him were based on the doctrine that *The Holy Qur'ān* and the *sunnah* are the only arbiters in all social and economic issues. He also waged a war against the *bid'at* (plural of *bid'ah* meaning innovation) or heresies deep-rooted in Muslim society at that time. The influence of the Wahhabiyyah movement of Arabia, because of the central role of Makkah in the dissemination of its ideas, crossed the territories of Arabia and was well-received in different parts of the Muslim world.

Nineteenth century revivalist movements such as the Sannusiyah and the *Mahdiyah* had their own emphases and priorities. The former, founded by Syed Muhammad B. Ali al Sanusi (1787-1859) in Libya, had many common elements with the Wahhabiyyah, e.g., emphasis on *The Holy Qur'ān* and the *sunnah*, but, due to its mystical orientation, it developed into a Sufi order. However, unlike other Sufi orders, the Sannusiyah fought a tough battle against *bid'at* and stood for the supremacy of *sunnah* and *sharī'ah* (religious law) over the common Muslim practices. Like Shah Wali Allah of Delhi, the Sanusi, too, emphasized the need for *Ijtihād*. His call for *Ijtihād* was coupled with a reassertion that no rational arguments or considerations can supersede the *sunnah* or the Quranic injunction.[32]

The *Mahdiyah* of Sudan, founded by Muhammad Ahmad al-Mehdi (1834-1885), focused on two areas, namely Sufism and the political struggle against the *Uthmāni Khilafat*. The *jihād* movement organized by him in 1881 reached its climax in the 1890's, but soon fell at the hands of Kitchener in 1898.

In the Indian subcontinent, the *jihād* movement of Syed Ahmad and Shah Isma'il Shahid and the Farai'ḍi movement of Haji Shari'at Allah (1781-1840) were manifestations of the yearning of the Muslims to establish a new socio-political order. However a shortcoming in these movements was lacking of with a clear definition of goals and objectives. This could only have been done by Muslim scholars with a full awareness of the problem combined with adequate knowledge of the philosophical foundation of Islamic political and social system. Shibli and Ameer Ali tried to help the Muslim community out of this difficulty, on a limited scale, by their historical writings.

3.2 The Movement for New Education

The movement for new education was founded by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). His analysis of the Muslim dilemma and its solution by the establishment of a university was pragmatic. In his opinion, the elevation of the Muslims was impossible without the adoption of western system of education.[33] Sir Syed's immediate concern was to provide western

education for the Muslims. He may not have given serious thought to the philosophy, objectives, and purposes of an Islamic education, but it is equally probable that the idea of an Islamic education system never occurred to him. Yet whatever the shortcomings in the Aligarh experiment, it succeeded in fulfilling its immediate objective of producing a generation of Muslims who could serve in the colonial system. The absence of any ideological commitment to Islam in the graduates of Aligarh was a great loss from an *ummatic* point of view,[34] but Aligarh did create a sense of "Muslim nationalism" among its graduates.

3.3 Tradition-bound Religious Education

The tradition-bound religious education system was in complete contrast to the secular approach of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. It held that the survival of the Muslims would be achieved only by adhering to the traditions of the past. This approach was propagated in several well-known seminaries. Prominent among these were Darul 'Uloom Deoband (founded in 1866), Mazharul 'Uloom Saharanpur (founded in 1866), and Darul 'Uloom Nadvatul 'Ulama Lucknow (founded in 1898). These schools followed the education system known as *dars niẓāmiyah*.[35] The Deoband school also provided a religious foundation for the one-nation theory (*muttaḥidah qaumiyyat*)[36] in India. Politically, it helped in getting rid of British colonialism. But nationalist *'ulama* are criticized by some researchers for not providing a solution to the problems of the Muslims. Though *azādi* (freedom) was their objective, they were not clear about the national objective of the Muslims.[37]

It is obvious from the above that both Sir Syed and the *'ulama* were concerned about the immediate problems, namely, the spread of education and the preservation of past tradition.

3.4 The Challenge from Western Orientalism

Neither the Western-educated Muslim intellectuals nor all the traditionally educated *'ulama* were in a clear position to respond to a new and more sophisticated challenge which came from the Western Orientalists. Western Orientalists, many of them serving the British Crown in India,[38] not only lacked objectivity but were also profoundly hostile to Islam, its prophet, and its history.

At a conceptual level, these writers grossly misrepresented the nature of prophethood in Islam. Perhaps due to their Christian background, Western writers judged Islam and the Holy Prophet (*Ṣal Allah-u-'alaihe wa sallam*) by Christian criteria. Danial has provided us

with ample examples representing this attitude. For instance, the Prophet Muhammad *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu ʿalaihi wa ʿalā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Sallam)* was proclaimed a "cipher." [39] Three marks of Muhammad's *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu ʿalaihi wa ʿalā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Sallam)* life were thought to be the violence and force with which he imposed his religion; the salacity and laxness with which he bribed followers when he did not compel; and finally his evident humanity…".[40] The *Wahi* (revelation) recorded in the Holy Qur'ān was, in general, regarded as the word and work of Sayeduna Muhammad *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu ʿalaihi wa ʿalā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Sallam)*. The fact that the prophet Muhammad *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu ʿalaihi wa ʿalā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Sallam)* was a human being and he did not claim to produce miracles was interpreted as a proof of his being "blasphemous." The birth and death of the Holy prophet *(Ṣal Allah-u-ʿalaihe wa sallam)*, being natural and human, were not regarded as befitting a prophet. [41]

In other words, since the Prophet *(Ṣal Allah-u-ʿalaihe wa sallam)* waged a *jihād* (war) against the exploitation of man by man, against economic corruption, idol-worship, social inequity, and immorality, and did not choose to offer himself for crucifixion, in their view, he deviated from the path of the prophets *(ʿAlaihim As-Salām)*. Not only early Western writers, as indicated by Danial, held this view; even modern historians such as Arnold J. Toynbee express his displeasure and disappointment at the "jeopardy" in which the prophet placed his religion "when he had migrated from Mecca to Medina and had become a brilliantly-successful statesman instead of remaining a conspicuously unsuccessful prophet *(Ṣal Allah-u-ʿalaihe wa sallam)*."[42] This "self-contradiction" of Islam and its founder has been a difficulty for Western critics in understanding Islam. In another place, Toynbee expresses similar feelings about the establishment of Islam as a system in al Madinah. " .. . the *Hijrah* ought to mark the date of the ruin of Islam and not the date since consecrated as that of its foundation."[43]

Their yearning for a mythical figure in the person of Prophet Muhammad *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu ʿalaihi wa ʿalā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Sallam)* was frustrated when they found him "evidently human."[44] It was also taken as a proof of his being "profane", "false" and "pretentious".[45] The search for the supernatural led many Western writers to stories which suited their purpose. One such story concerned a meeting between the prophet *(Ṣal Allah-u-ʿalaihe wa sallam)*, when he was ten or eleven years old, and thirty years before … prophethood, and a Syrian Christian monk, Bahira. It was reported by al Waqidi, and on his authority by a few others, that the prophet *(Ṣal Allah-u-ʿalaihe wa sallam)*, when he was a minor, often accompanied his trader

uncle, Abu Talib. On one such journey, when Bahira saw this child, he paid respect to him and told his uncle to be careful about his nephew because he showed signs of being a prophet. It was claimed that in those few moments when the prophet-to-be was with Bahira, he learned the Christian faith- which, thirty years later, was presented by him under the name Islam.[46]

Danial, after reviewing writings of Western writers such as San Pedro Pascual and William of Tripoli, concludes that the purpose of William of Tripoli was probably "... to show Muslims that their beliefs were really or nearly Christian, I think that he may have wanted to convince them that the Bible is the source of *The Holy Qur'ān*." [47]

At this point it is necessarily only to mention that among late 19th century scholars from the subcontinent, the strongest reaction to it came from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. In his *Khuṭbāt al Ahmadiyah*[48] on the basis of evidence collected from historical works in the libraries of London, he wrote in 1869 a refutation of Sir William Muir's, *The Life of Mahomet, Muhammad (The Prophet).* [49] Sir Syed used Judeo-Christian scriptures extensively in his book. Responding to the issue of polygamy, referring to the *Torah*, he indicated that the Hebrew Patriarch and Prophets Ibrahim, Yaqub, Musa, Dawood, and Sulayman (*'Alaihim As-Salām*) were all polygamous. According to him, polygamy as such was not evil nor did it disqualify any of them from being a prophet of Allah Almighty. The argument he developed was that if, despite being polygamous, Hebrew prophets (*'Alaihim As-Salām*) were genuine and true in their claim and in their mission, how could, on the basis of his polygamy, Prophet Muhammad (*Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu 'alaihi wa 'alā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Ṣallam)* be called a "profane" and "licentious" person (god forbid).

He rejected the historicity of the story about Bahira. In a detailed chapter on the early life of the prophet Muhammad *(Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu 'alaihi wa 'alā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Ṣallam)* evaluated the sources used by William Muir and other Western writers, and on the basis of historical evidence and rational argument, he concluded that the story was nothing but a fiction as per his research.

Among other responses from the Muslim scholars of the subcontinent, most notable was that of Rahmat Allah Keranawi whose refutation of the Reverend Carl Pfander and William St. Clair Tisdall, *The mīzānu'l ḥaqq*[50] soon became a classic in Urdu and other Islamic languages.[51] Rahmat: Allah conducted several dialogues with Christian missionaries and wrote prolifically in defense of Islam.

Defense of Islam, whether from the attacks of Western orientalists or from the onslaught of Christian missionaries, was still a passive and apologetic activity. It could not serve as an ideology for

nation-building. For the reconstruction and revival of the lost Muslim glory in the subcontinent something positive, dynamic, and constructive was needed. Shibli and Ameer Ali tried to fulfill this gap by attempting to revive the image of the past by re-writing Muslim history and making it more relevant to the present and future of the Muslims.

While Muslims of the subcontinent were rediscovering their own history, their counterparts in the Near East were undergoing a similar experience. To counter the colonialists, efforts were being made to discover the Islamic past and define its goals, objectives, and its role in the future.

3.5 The Arab Response

To liberate itself from foreign influence and to re-establish its identity and independence, the Arabic-speaking world responded in four distinct ways. The first and major response came in the form of a call for Arab nationalism.

Concerned Arab thinkers, Muslim as well as non-Muslim, directed their efforts against the Western colonialism with the objective of re-establishing Arab unity as symbolized by the political and cultural revival of the Arabs. The search for a practical solution to the general decline, for a way to regain past glory and a bright future, led many Arab thinkers to conclude that a national revival was possible only with the help of nationalism. But what kind of nationalism? This question led to three major trends among Arab nationalists, "the convinced, the confused, and the ambivalent".[52] It was recognized that Islam was perhaps the main factor in unification of the Arabs in the 7th century. However, in an age not so sympathetic to religion, religion did not enjoy the same privilege. Moreover, religion, in their understanding, was a hindrance to scientific advancements, progress, and development. A subsidiary argument against basing the Arab ideal on religion was that the Arabic-speaking world included Muslims and Christians as well as Jews: no single religion could be taken as the basis of a diversified society. The "convinced" nationalists proposed using science, technology, economic, and social development as the basis for national unity among the Arabs.[53] This approach naturally suggested a secular model in which religion was practically absent from the social scene.[54] It included, among others, N. A. Faris and Taha Hussein as its spokesmen.

Those who were "confused" first directed their efforts towards a critical review of Islamic history. Among those who have been categorized as "confused", Khalid Muhammad Khalid could perhaps be considered a representative figure. They reviewed basic Islamic social and political ideas such as the concept of *khilāfah* (vicegerency of Allah

Almighty on earth) "Religious government" for them had no justification within the Islamic sources, namely *The Holy Qur'ān* and *al hadith*. What was known as religious, in their opinion, was mostly directed by the personal ambitions and interests of the religious leaders.[55] Ali 'Abd al-Raziq in his *Al Islam wa uṣūl al Ḥukm*, (Cairo, 1922), challenged the authority of the "religious leaders" (*'ulama*) as well as of certain political doctrines. While Khalid, in his *Min Huna Nabda*, (Cairo, 1950)[56] raised a systematic question: where do we go from here? Remarkably influenced by the Western political thought, particularly that of Hobbes and Locke,'Abd al Raziq and associates tried to read Western ideas in the Islamic writings.[57] There was a third and more confusing approach held by some Arab thinkers who wanted to travel in two boats at one time. They visualized an "Arab-Islamic legacy"[58] as a prerequisite for Arab nationalism. They did not reject religion as obsolete, but, at the same time, they did regard Islam as a "controversial"[59] factor in the national revival.

One thing was obvious, there was a need for a re-interpretation of Muslim history and its relevance to society. The "secularist" as well as the "ambivalent" nationalist could not proceed without historical and philosophical foundations. They had to re-interpret the past so that a better understanding of the past might lead to a viable future.

Religious historians took up this challenge with both hands. They not only filled this gap, but also provided more concrete grounds for increasing awareness of the Arab heritage. These included Muhammad Husayn Haykal (d. 1956) and Abbas Mahmood al 'Aqqad. They wrote about past Muslim dynasties, the prophet of Islam Muhammad (*Rasūlullah Khātam un Nabiyyīn Ṣallallahu 'alaihi wa 'alā Ālihi wa Aṣḥābihi wa Ṣallam)* and his companions (*Raḍi Allah 'anhum*), and inspired the Arabs with the idea that they, too, had things of which to be proud. Reminding the Muslims of the glory of their past did reinforce self-confidence, but the nostalgia and the romanticism created by past glorification developed into a tendency to be so much involved in past accomplishments that current problems were side lined.

At the other extreme the secularists wanted to dissociate themselves completely from the past by building a nationstate. Haykal and 'Aqqad's historic writings introduced their readers to a past created by their forefathers. By implication it raised a legitimate question in the minds of their readers: if Islam could make our forefathers achieve what they did, why Islam could not do the same for us?

There were historians among the nationalists who were mainly concerned about the past history of specific regions. In Egypt, historians such as Salim Hasan and Zaki 'Ali[60] focused on the local history of Egypt. A "parochial" awakening was thus achieved. This particularism of the

parochial movement may be compared with the *Shuʻūbiyah* [61] of 2nd-3rd century Islam.

Parallel to the secular and parochial approaches in historical writing was a third school of thought. This school of thought called for pan-Arabism, implying supremacy of the Arabs as a nation. It did not treat the Egyptian, the Syrian, or the ʻIraqis as separate peoples. All who spoke Arabic and shared emotionally and mentally in the oneness of Arab culture were one nation. It contended that the heritage of the Arabs, once properly comprehended, would not only create self-respect and confidence in the Arabs, but might also motivate progress and development in their existing cultures. ʻAbd aI-Rahman al Kawakibi (1849-1902) can be mentioned as representative of this view.[62]

4. Conclusion

This brief overview of the development of Muslim thought in response to political, economic and cultural colonialism of the West over the rest shows that Muslim scholars in the Arabian speaking world and the subcontinent tried to reawaken the depressed Muslim community by highlighting achievements of their forefathers as an evidence of their unexplored potentialities. A reflection of their glorious past, resurrection of their heroes, they thought can help in regaining their confidence in their own selves. In a sense this methodology did contribute in reawakening of the Muslims. Sayed Amir Ali and Shibli Naʻmani in this respect played an important role in the subcontinent. With this brief background we will try to look into their time, society and intellectual climate to further explore and examine impact of their understanding of history on the later intellectual, political and cultural development in the Muslim community of the subcontinent.

Notes and References

[1]Bishop Reginald Heber, *Narrative of a Journey Through the Upper Provinces of India*1, no. 2, London, 1928, p. 294, quoted in Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 34.

[2]Altaf Husayn Hali, *Ḥayāt-i-Javed*, (Lahore: ʻIshrat Publishing House, 1971), 93-94.

[3]Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 71.

[4]S.M.Ikram, Muslim *Civilization in India*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 287-288.

[5] S.M. Ikram, *Op. cit*. p. 288.

[6] S.M. Ikram, *ibid*.

[7] S.M. Ikram, *Op. cit*. p. 222.

[8]Sidney J. Owen, *The Fall of the Moghul Empire*, (London: John Murray, 1912), quoted in Ikram, *Op. cit*., p. 222.

[9]*Khuṭbāt-i-Ilhamiyah*, quoted in Nadvi, *Qadiyanism: A Critical Study*, (Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, 1967),89.

[10]William Wilson Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, (New Delhi: Rupa, 2018).

[11]Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul empire A.D. 1656-1668*, (London: Oxford University Press 1916), 439.

[12]"Letters from Chief Commissioner Punjab," *Canning Papers*, City Library, Leeds, quoted in Peter Hardy, *op. cit*., p. 36. Peter Hardy, also, quotes from Sir William Muir (1819-1905) who expressed similar ideas about Muslims in India.

[13]Azizur Rahman Malik, *British policy and the Muslims in Bengal, 1757-1856*, (Dhaka: Dacca, 1961), 50.

[14] It is interesting to note that for eight hundred years Muslims maintained their own cultural identity but the western lifestyle influenced them more rapidly than the Indian culture.

[15]Abulhasan Ali Nadvi, *Muslims in India*, (Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, 1980), 87.

[16]Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972)), 293.

[17]In a conference organized by the World Council of Churches in Chambesy, Switzerland, such misuse of *diakonia* for proselytism was disowned and condemned by the participating representatives of the Christian Churches in the following words: "The conference strongly condemns all such abuse of *diakonia* (service). Its Christian members dissociate themselves in the name of Christianity from any service which has degraded itself by having any purpose whatever beside *agape* (love for God and neighbour). They declare that any diakonia undertaken for any ulterior motive is apropaganda instrument and not an expression of agape. They agree to exercise their full power and use whatever means at their disposal to bring Christian Churches and religious organizations to a proper awareness of this situation.";Khurshid Ahmad and David Kerr (guest editors), Christian Mission and Islamic Da'wah, *International Review of Mission*, Geneva, Vol. no. 260, Oct. 1976, p. 459.

[18]Altaf Husayn Hali, op. cit., p. 402; Khurshid Ahmad, "*Religious Literature*" in *Tārīkh Adabīyāt Musālmananī-Pakistan wā Hīnd*, ed. S. F. Mahmoud vol. 10, Urdu Adab 1914-1972, (Lahore: Punjab University, 1972), 274.

[19]Shibli, *Maqālāt*, vol. 8, (A'zamgarh: Maktba Mu'arif, 1938), 13-14; Percival Spear, *op. cit*., p. 293.

[20]Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of the Religion, The Significance of Religious Myth, Symbolism and Ritual Within Life and Culture*, (New York:Harcourt Brace, 1959), 20.

[21]Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf Publishers, 1977), 155.

[22] Mundaka (11.11.11) Upanishad for example says, "That immortal Brahman alone is before. That Brahman is behind, that Brahman is to the right and left. Brahman alone pervades everything above and below; this universe is that Supreme Brahman," Swami Nikhlananda, *The Upanishads*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 115.

[23] Nicholson puts this idea in a succinct way. "The whole of Sufism rests on the belief that when the individual self is lost, the universal self is found, or, in religious language, that ecstasy affords the only means by which the soul can directly communicate and become united with God. Asceticism, purification, love, gnosis,

saintship-- all the leading ideas of Sufism are developed from this cardinal principle."; Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, (Boston, MA: Routledge, 1975), 59

[24]Muhammad Farman, "*Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi*", in M. M. Sharief, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1966), 879.

[25] Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, (New York: Harper & Row Torch Book, 1963), 5.

[26]Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 35.

[27] Describing the characteristics of *dars niẓāmi*, the curriculum designed by Nizamudin, Shibli reports that this curriculum included the most difficult books in each discipline such as *Nurul Anwar*, *Rashidiyah, Shams Bazighah*.. Shibli, *Maqālāt,* (Aʿẓamgaṛh: Dārulmuṣannifīn, 1930-1938.), 99.

[28]Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, *Shah Waliullah Kay Siyasi Maktūbat*, (Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1950), 47-5l.

[29]Shah Wali Allah, *Ḥujjatuallah al-Bāligha*, vol. I, tr. Abdurahim, (Lahore: Quami Kutub Khana, 1961), 657, 658, 660, 699.

[30]*Ibid*, 697.

[31]*Ibid*, 147.

[32]Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Sanusiyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam*, (Leiden, Holland: E. J. Brill, 1968), 80.

[33]Sir Syed was convinced that only a systematic introduction of western ideas could change the condition of the Muslims. In 1864 he founded a scientific society for this purpose. The society translated various texts of scientific nature from English to Urdu. He also founded modern schools in Ghazipur and other districts. Ultimately, in 1875 the school in Aligarh was established. Altaf Husayn Hali, *Ḥayāt-e Javed*, (Lahore: Ishrat Publishing House, 1971), 336. In 1886 Sir Syed founded Muhammadan Educational Conference and in its first meeting. on December 2, 1886 following resolution was adopted. The Conference shall have objectives: "1. To help Muslims in achieving high level of western education; 2. To investigate into the nature of religious education given to Muslims,, in English schools and to help in proper dissemination of Islamic information to the Muslims. Altaf Husayn Hali, *Ḥayāt-e Javed*, (Lahore: Ishrat Publishing House, 1971), 238.

[34]Abul Aʿla Maududi, *Taʿlimat: Essays on Education*, (Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd., 1972), 19.

[35]Dars Nizamiyah should not be confused with the Madrasah Nizamiya of Tusi. This syllabus was formulated by one Mulla Nizamudin of Frangi Mahal, Lucknow in eighteenth century. Shibli, *Maqālāt-i-Shibli* vol. 3, (Azamgarh: Matbaʿ Muʿarif, 1932), 91-100.

[36]Yohanan Friedman, "The Attitude of the Jamʿiyyat-i-ʿUlama-i-Hind to the Indian National Movement and the Establishment of Pakistan, "*The Ulama' in Modern History* vol. 7,(Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1971), 162.

[37]Maulana Syed Abul Aʿla Maududi, *Tāhrik-i-Azādi-Hind aur Musalman*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, Ltd., 1970), 111, 116, 119-120.

[38]William Muir and Sir; T H Weir, *The life of Moḥammad, from original sources* (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1923).

[39] Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Mak1ng of an Image*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 86.

[40]Norman Daniel, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

[41]Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, ed. D. C. Somervell, vol. II, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969), 42.

[42]Arnold J. Toynbee, *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 556 (vol. VI of the original).

[43]*Ibid.* p.556.

[44]Norman Daniel, *op, cit*., p. 107.

[45]*Ibid.*, 104.

[46] *Ibid.*, 88-89.

[47]*Ibid.*, 237.

[48]*Khuṭbāt al Aḥmadiyah* written by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan while he was staying with Ross Masood (son) for around sixteen months in England and published simultaneously in English and Urdu in 1870. Reprinted (Lahore: Premier Book House, 1968).

[49] Muir, *The Life of Mahomet, Muhammad (The Prophet),* (Oxford University: Smith, 1958).

[50] Carl Pfander and William St. Clair Tisdall, *The mīzānu'l ḥaqq (Balance of truth)*, (London: Religious Tract Society, 1911).

[51] Kairanvi, *Iẓhār-ul-Ḥaq (The Truth Revealed)*, (London: Ta-Ha Publishers. 1992).

[52]Isma'il Raji al Faruqi, *On Arabism: Urubah and Religion,* (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1962), 121.

[53]*Ibid*., 124-125.

[54] *Ibid*., 122.

[55]*Ibid*., 127.

[56] Trans. I. R. al Faruqi, (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953).

[57] *Ibid.*, 154.

[58] *Ibid.*, 129.

[59]Abdallah Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 28.

[60] Mostafa Zaida, "Modern Egyptian Historiography", *The Middle East Affairs* 4, no. 8-9 (1953): 269-271.

[61]*Shu'ūbiyyah* was a literary movement meant for projecting the non-Arabic tradition in contradistinction with the pre-Islamic literary tradition. The word has been used in *The Holy Qur'ān* in surah al-Hujrat 49:13; it literally means groups or nations, It says, "O mankind, We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into races and tribes, so that you may identify one another. Surely the noblest of you, in Allah's sight, is the one who is most pious of you. Surely Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware." During the Marwani dynasty (684-750 C.E.), the role of pre-Islamic Arabia, as well as the existing Arabs, was over-emphasized. As a natural reaction to it, *Shu'ūbiyah* emphasized the transcendence and excellence of the non-Arab literary tradition viz SassanI culture. The pharoanist of Egypt, the Phoenecianist of Lebanon or the Syranist of Syria presented no different a picture than the 'Ajamis of 2nd and 3rd century Islam.

[62]Zaida, *Op. cit*., pp. 269-271.

The Superiority of a person who learns (Islām, becomes a religious scholar) and then teaches it to others

Narrated Abu-Musa (*Raḍi Allah 'anhu*): The Prophet (*Ṣal Allah-u-'alaihe wa sallam*) said, "The example of guidance and knowledge with which Allah Almighty has sent me is like abundant rain falling on the earth, some of which was fertile soil that absorbed rainwater and brought forth vegetation and grass in abundance. (And) another portion of it was hard and held the rainwater and Allah Almighty benefited the people with it and they utilized it for drinking, making their animals drink from it and to irrigate the land for cultivation. (And) a portion of it was barren which could neither hold the water nor bring forth vegetation (then that land gave no benefits). The first is the example of the person who comprehends Allah's religion (Islam) and gets benefits (from the knowledge) which Allah Almighty has revealed through me (the prophet (*Ṣal Allah-u-'alaihe wa sallam*) and learns and then teaches it to others. The (last exampleis that of a) person who does not care for it and does not take Allah's guidance revealed through me (He is like that barren land)."

Ṣaḥīḥ-āal-Bukhārī

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